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Abstract. In 2017, Aggarwal, Joux, Prakash, and Santha proposed an
innovative NTRU-like public-key cryptosystem that was believed to be
quantum resistant, based on Mersenne prime numbers q = 2N − 1. After
a successful attack designed by Beunardeau, Connolly, Géraud, and Nac-
cache, the authors revised the protocol which was accepted for Round 1
of the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process organized
by NIST. The security of this protocol is based on the assumption that
a so-called Mersenne Low Hamming Combination Search Problem (ML-
HCombSP) is hard to solve. In this work, we present a reduction of
MLHCombSP to an instance of Integer Linear Programming (ILP). This
opens new research directions that are necessary to be investigated in or-
der to assess the concrete robustness of such cryptosystem. We propose
different approaches to perform such reduction. Moreover, we uncover
a new family of weak keys, for whose our reduction leads to an attack
consisting in solving < N3 ILP problems of dimension 3.
Keywords: Post-Quantum Cryptography · Public-Key Cryptography ·
Integer Linear Programming · Mersenne-Based Cryptosystem.
1 Introduction
In [2], Aggarwal, Joux, Prakash, and Santha introduced a new public-key encryp-
tion scheme similar to the NTRU cryptosystem [12] that employs the properties
of Mersenne numbers.
A Mersenne number is an integer q = 2N − 1 so that N is prime. One
can associate to each element in the ring Zq the binary string representing the
unique representative 0 ≤ a < q of the class [a] ∈ Zq. The secret key is a
pair of elements F and G ∈ Zq so that their Hamming weight is h <
√
N/10.
Let R be a random element of Zq; the public key is given by the pair (R, T ≡
RF +G mod q). The security assumption (and the mathematical problem that
supports the robustness of this cryptosystem) is that it is hard to recover F and
G, knowing only R and T . This assumption is called Mersenne Low Hamming
Combination Search Problem (MLHCombSP).
This version is actually the second iteration of the cryptosystem, first pre-
sented in [1]. The security assumptions were based on a problem similar to
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MLHCombSP called Mersenne Low Hamming Ratio Search Problem (MLHRa-
tioSP). That has been attacked by Beunardeau et al. in [6]. There the attack
is performed via a series of calls to an SVP-oracle. Its complexity has been es-
timated by de Boer et al. in [7]. They also showed that a Meet-in-the-Middle
attack is possible using locality-sensitive hashing, which improves upon brute
force. However, Beunardeau et al. turned out to be the most effective of the two.
After the publications of these works, Aggarwal et al. revised the protocol [2] to
prevent the above attacks from being effective against full-scale ciphers.
This protocol has been accepted to the Round 1 of the Post-Quantum Cryp-
tography Standardization Process organized by NIST. However, it does not ap-
pear among the proposals for Round 2.
1.1 Our Contribution/Outline
In this work we present a non-trivial reduction to a relatively low-dimensional In-
teger Linear Programming (ILP) instance of the underlying mathematical prob-
lem of [2]. The resulting instance of ILP produces the right solution with prob-
ability p, that depends on the size of G. It is possible to perform a trade-off
between the size of the ILP problem to solve and the success probability.
In section 2 we introduce notation and related work. Furthermore, we re-
cap the Beunardeau et al. attack against [1] with a generalization to the MLH-
CombSP. Section 3 describes our reduction together with the success probability
analysis. There we describe variations in the description of the ILP to be solved,
that allow some flexibility for the attacker. In particular, one can perform a
trade-off between the success probability and the dimension of the resulting
ILP. The application of this trade-off is shown for two examples. In section 4 we
describe a new family of weak keys and the probability of such a pair to appear.
This family is obtained by performing two independent rotations on F and G
so that, after these rotations, they become as small as possible. In this way the
size of the set of the weak keys increases. For example, for N = 1279 and h = 17
(parameters used in [6]), a random key is weak in the sense of Beunardeau et al.
with probability ∼ 2−34. It is possible to estimate that a random key becomes
weak after rotations with probability ∼ 2−11.
2 Preliminaries
Definition 1 Let N be a prime number and let q = 2N − 1. Then q is called a
Mersenne number. If q is also prime, then it is called Mersenne prime number.
Let seqN : {0, ..., q − 1} → {0, 1}N be the map which associates to each A
the corresponding N -bits binary representation seqN (A) with most-significant
bit to the left.
Denote with Zq the ring of integers modulo q. We extend the function seqN
also to elements in Zq. Let us consider an integer 0 ≤ B < q, seqN maps [B] ∈ Zq
to the N -bits binary representation of B. We define the Hamming weight w(F )
of F as the Hamming weight of seqN (F ), i.e. the number of 1s in seqN (F ).
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Lemma 1 Let k ≥ 0 be a positive integer, let A be an N -bits number, and let
q = 2N − 1. Then seqN (2kA mod q) corresponds to a rotation of seqN (A) of
k positions to the left and seqN (2
−kA mod q) corresponds to a rotation of k
positions to the right.
Proof. We prove it by induction on k. Write seqN (A) = (AN−1, ..., A1, A0),
where AN−1 is the most significant bit of A. Then we can represent A as
A = AN−1 · 2N−1 + ...+A1 · 2 +A0.
If we multiply A by 2 modulo q we obtain
2 ·A ≡ AN−1 · 2N +AN−2 · 2N−1 + ...+A1 · 22 +A0 · 2 mod q
≡ AN−2 · 2N−1 + ...+A1 · 22 +A0 · 2 +AN−1 mod q.
Then seqN (2 · A) = (AN−2, ..., A0, AN−1), i.e. the left rotation of 1 position
of seqN (A).
By inductive hypothesis, seqN (2
k ·A) corresponds to the left rotation of k posi-
tions of seqN (A), then seqN (2
k+1 · A) = seqN (2 · 2k · A) corresponds to the left
rotation of one position of seqN (2
k ·A), that is the left rotation of k+1 positions
of seqN (A). The case right rotations of seqN (A) follows trivially. 
The security of the Aggarwal et al. cryptosystem [2] relies on the assumption
that the following two problems are hard to solve.
Mersenne Low Hamming Ratio Search Problem Let q = 2N − 1 be a
Mersenne prime number, h < N an integer, F and G two integers chosen at
random from the set of N -bit numbers with Hamming weight h. Let H < q be




The Mersenne Low Hamming Ratio Search Problem (MLHRatioSP) is to find
(F,G) knowing h and H.
Mersenne Low Hamming Combination Search Problem Let q = 2N − 1
be a Mersenne prime number, h < N an integer, R a random N -bit number, and
F,G integers chosen at random from the set of N -bits numbers with Hamming
weight h. Let T < q be the non-negative integer such that
RF +G ≡ T mod q. (2)
The Mersenne Low Hamming Combination Search Problem (MLHCombSP) is
to find (F,G) knowing h and the pair (R, T ).






and 4h2 < N , for a desired λ-bit security level. After the publications of the
attacks by Beunardeau et al. [6] and De Boer et al. [7], the authors revised the
choice of the parameters ([2]) to be such that h = λ and 10h2 < N .
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2.1 Previous Attacks
Brute force attack In [1], Aggarwal et al. showed that a brute force attack to





trials. This attack consists in assuming
that one of the two secret numbers, say F , has a 1 in the most significant bit
(condition that can be obtained by a rotation of seqN (F )). Then one should
try, for every N -bits number with 1 as most significant bit and weight h, if the
corresponding G through relation (1) has weight h. This approach does not apply






Meet-in-the-Middle attack De Boer et al. [7] showed that a Meet-in-the-Middle














ers. This can be generalized to the MLHCombSP.
Weak Keys and Lattice attack Following the parameters’ setting in [1], Beu-
nardeau et al. found a weak key attack to the MLHRatioSP for the case when
both F and G happen to have bits set to 1 only in their right halves, i.e.
F,G <
√
2N [6]. This event happens with probability 2−2h.
Following the above idea, Beunardeau et al. also presented a more general
attack to the MLHRatioSP which consists in guessing a decomposition of F and
G into windows of bits such that all the ‘1’s are “close” to the right-most bit
of such windows. Then F and G can be recovered through a lattice reduction
algorithm such as LLL [13]. Even if Beunardeau et al. showed that this attack
practically hits the security estimations in [1], they did not present any clear
asymptotic analysis of its complexity. However, de Boer et al. [7], computed the
complexity of this attack.
In [2], the authors stated that the above attack likely generalizes to the
MLHCombSP case. Building directly on the work presented in [7], we show in
the next subsection that this is true. However we refer the reader to [6] and [7]
for a more detailed description.
2.2 The Beunardeau et al. attack on MLHCombSP
Since F is taken at random among the N -bits numbers with Hamming weight
h, w.h.p. the ‘1’ valued bits of seqN (F ) do not appear in big clusters along
the N possible positions. One then computes an interval-like partition P of
{0, . . . , N − 1} at random, i.e. each set of P is of the form {a, a+ 1, . . . , b− 1, b},
with 0 ≤ a < b < N . If each ‘1’ valued bit of seqN (F ) falls in the right-half of
one of the sets of P, then each one of them corresponds to a binary substring
of seqN (F ), corresponding in turn to a “small” number. Therefore, the array of
these numbers can be seen as a representation of F .
Let P = {P1, .., Pk} and Q = {Q1, ..., Ql} be two interval-like partitions of
{0, ..., N−1} and (R, T ) ∈ Z2q be public parameters of an MLHCombSP instance.
Let pi, qi be the smallest elements of Pi, Qi respectively. Let us consider the
following integer lattice.
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LP,Q,R,T =
(x1, ..., xk, y1, ..., yl, u) | R ·
k∑
i=1
2pi · xi +
l∑
j=1
2qi · yi − uT ≡ 0 mod q

The above defined lattice LP,Q,R,T has determinant det(LP,Q,R,T ) = q and
dimension d = k + l + 1. Let (F,G) ∈ Z2q be such that w(F ) = w(G) = h and
RF +G ≡ T as in a MLHCombSP instance. Define the vector
s = (f1, ..., fk, g1, ..., gl, 1) ∈ LP,Q,R,T ,
where 0 ≤ fi < 2|Pi| and 0 ≤ gj < 2|Qj | are the unique natural numbers such that∑k
i=1 fi·2pi = F and
∑l
j=1 gj ·2qj = G, where |·| denotes the cardinality operator.
One wishes to find the vector s through some lattice reduction algorithm applied
to LP,Q,R,T .
The lattice LP,Q,R,T is very similar to the one defined in [7] for the MLHRa-
tioSP and their success probability analysis of the attack holds for this case too.
Therefore the following conclusions follow directly from the work of de Boer et
al.
Given two partitions P and Q of {0, ..., N −1} with block size at least N/d+
Θ(logN), where d = k+ l+ 1 with k = |P | and l = |Q|. The success probability
of finding the vector s ∈ LP,Q,R,T using a SVP-oracle is 2−2h+o(1).
Remark 1 The above attack is actually a simplified version of the attack of
Beunardeau et al. Indeed, a more general attack can be made by considering the
variation of partition sizes and the fraction of each partition block. This variant
of the attack has success probability 2−(2+δ)h+o(1), for some small constant δ > 0
[7].
Remark 2 In practice, instead of an SVP-oracle, the LLL algorithm [13] which
has polynomial complexity is used. This decreases the overall complexity of the
attack, but the success probability is decreased too [7].
The above attack was made against the parameters setting contained in the
first version of Aggarwal et al. work. However, as already mentioned, in the
most recent version of their work the authors revisited the protocol in order to
withstand it.
2.3 Integer Linear Programming
An Integer Linear Programming (ILP) problem in his canonical form is defined
as follows. Given a matrix A ∈ Qm×n and two vectors c ∈ Qn and b ∈ Qm,
minimize (or maximise) the quantity
cTx





An ILP-oracle is an oracle that solves any ILP instance.
Solving a general ILP is proved to be NP-hard [17]. Nevertheless, understanding
the complexity of specific families of ILP problems is not an easy task: it can
widely vary from case to case [18]. For example, when the number of variables
is fixed, or when the problem can be reduced to a simple Linear Programming
problem, it is proved that it has polynomial complexity [14, 20].
Nowadays there exists families of ILP solving algorithms, for example Branch
and Bound [16], Lagrange relaxation [10], Column Generation [3], and the Cut-
ting Planes [15], whose implementations [9, 11] are able to solve in practice rel-
atively challenging instances.
3 ILP Reduction
Let R, T be two random elements of Z∗q . We define the map ϕ : Zq → Zq
sending X 7→ −RX+T . Any point on the graph of ϕ, namely {(X,ϕ(X))}X∈Zq ,
satisfying the condition that both coordinates have Hamming weight equals to
h is a solution to the MLHCombSP. We denote such condition as the graph
condition.
We notice that ϕ is bijective, for it is the combination of two bijective func-
tions (i.e. multiplication times a nonzero element of a field and sum with an
element of the underlying group). This means that for any subset U ⊆ Zq, the
restriction ϕ|U is injective. Hence, | Im(ϕ|U )| = |U|. We assume that Im(ϕ|U ) is
a random element of the family of subsets of cardinality |U| of Zq.
Let V be another subset of Zq. The probability that a random element of
Im(ϕ|U ) is in V is given by |V|2N−1 . Hence the expected size of Im(ϕ|U ) ∩ V is
given by the mean of the Hypergeometric distribution [8] in |U| draws, from a
population of size 2N − 1 that contains |V| objects that yield a success. That is:




Let EG be the number of ‘0’ valued bits before the first ‘1’ valued bit in
seqN (G). In this case, one can set V = {2N−EG−1, . . . , 2N−EG − 1} and |V| =
2N−EG . With such a bound on G, given a U of size < 2EG , with F ∈ U , there is
only one expected solution to the system of constraints:
T −Rx ≡ y mod q,
x ∈ U ,
y ∈ V.
(4)
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and one solution is certainly x = F , y = G.
Our attack is meant to find solid choices for U and V to use to solve (4).
Remark 3 For every fixed instance of x ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} , there is exactly one
a ∈ Z that satisfies 0 ≤ T +aq−Rx < q. In particular, this means that for every
fixed instance of x ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} there exists at most one a ∈ Z satisfying
2h ≤ T + aq −Rx ≤ 2N − 2N−h.
It is possible to represent (4) in terms of integers:
T + qa−Rx = y,
x ∈ U ,
y ∈ V.
(5)
Here, there is an abuse of notation: we intend U as the intersection U ∩ {2h −
1, . . . , 2N − 2N−h} and V as the intersection V ∩ {2h − 1, . . . , 2N − 2N−h}.
Remark 3 implies that the number of solutions of the system is smaller than
or equal to | Im(ϕ|U )∩ V|. So the expected number of solutions to (5) is smaller
than or equal to |U||V|
2N−1 .
For some choices of U and V, one can find solutions to (5) using an ILP-oracle.
Let U = {lx3 , lx3 +1, . . . ,ux3 −1,ux3} for some lx3 and ux3 and let V =
{ly, ly +1, . . . ,uy −1,uy} for some ly and uy. Assuming that (5) has a unique
solution, then it is detected by the following ILP instance:
Tx1 + qx2 −Rx3 = y, (6)
with constraints 
x1 = 1,
lx3 ≤ x3 ≤ ux3 ,
ly ≤ y ≤ uy .
(7)
Finding good choices on U and V (i.e. small and containing F and G with
high probability) is difficult for the ILP instance (6). At the cost of increasing
the dimension of the ILP problem to be solved, one can reduce the size of U .
One such way is to fully exploit the fact that F has weight exactly h to
establish the following ILP problem in the integer variables x1, x2, x3, n1, . . . , nN :







0 ≤ ni ≤ 1, for i = 1, . . . , N∑n
i=1 ni = h,
ly ≤ y ≤ uy .
(9)
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. On the other
hand, the dimension of the ILP to be solved moved from being 3 to being N +3.
In subsections 3.2 and 3.3, we explore ways to perform trade-offs in order to
choose in advance either the number of variables of the ILP to be solved or the
size of U .
3.1 Cyclic Shifts
Consider the multiplication in both sides of (2) by 2k, for some k > 0,
2kRF + 2kG ≡ 2kT mod q. (10)
Define R̃ ≡ 2kR mod q, T̃ ≡ 2kT mod q, F̃ ≡ 2kF mod q and G̃ ≡ 2kG
mod q. Note that w(F̃ ) = w(G̃) = h. Through (10) we can define two new
MLHCombSP instances:
RF̃ + G̃ ≡ T̃ mod q, (11)
where both F and G are rotated by k positions to the left, and
R̃F + G̃ ≡ T̃ mod q, (12)
where only G is rotated. By combining (11) and (12) we can rotate independently
F and G. At the cost of N2 rotations we can always find the cyclic shifts that
minimizes both F and G. Performing the shifts greatly improves the probability
that for small U and V of the form {2l, . . . , 2l+1}, F and G solve (5). This
results in a family of weak keys not considered in [6]. A complete analysis of the
improvements is reported in Section 4.
3.2 Portion of F
As mentioned above, it is possible to reduce the dimension of the ILP (8) to be
solved at the cost of increasing the size of U . One of such methods consists in
considering only the most significant bits of F in the constraints. Let γ be in the
real interval (0, 1]. Let h̃ = dγhe and let Ñ = dγNe. It is possible to solve the
following ILP problem instead of (8):





i=1 ni · 2i−1 − x3/2N−Ñ | < 1,
0 ≤ ni ≤ 1, for i = 1, . . . , Ñ
h̃− t ≤
∑n
i=1 ni ≤ h̃+ t,
ly ≤ y ≤ uy .
(14)
for some 0 ≤ t ≤ h̃.
MLHCombSP can be reduced to an ILP Problem 9
Proposition 1 For fixed n1, . . . , nÑ there exist exactly 2
N−Ñ possible x3 satis-
fying the first inequality in (14).
Proof. Let write a general x3 as x3 = FN−12
N−1 + · · ·+ F020. It follows that
x3/2
N−Ñ = FN−12
Ñ−1 + · · ·+ FN−Ñ2
0 + FN−Ñ−12
−1 + · · ·+ F02Ñ−N .
We notice that FN−1, . . . , FN−Ñ are set to be equal to nÑ , . . . , n1 by (14), while
the remaining coefficients can assume values in {0, 1}. There are exactly 2N−Ñ
such x3. 
Let us compute the size of U that arises from the given constraints. Thanks to
Proposition 1, the size of U is determined only by the constraints on n1, . . . , nÑ .
The conditions to be satisfied are:{
0 ≤ ni ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ Ñ ,
h̃− t ≤
∑Ñ
i=1 ni ≤ h̃+ t,
for some 0 ≤ t ≤ h̃. In this scenario, the solution to the MLHCombSP is not
guaranteed to be a solution to the above system. Indeed, F satisfies the above
constraints if and only if its most Ñ significant bits contain between h̃ − t and
h̃+ t ‘1’ valued bits. This probability is given by:






















A possible approach to reduce the dimension of the ILP (8) is to merge more
than one bit in a single ni. Say, for example, that we merge the bits in pairs;
this means that each one of the ni can assume values in {0, 1, 2, 3} and that the
total weight varies between h and 2h, as we prove in Proposition 2.
Example 1 Let us consider F = (00010011). By merging bits in pairs and
assuming the MILP gives the correct solution, one gets n1 = (00), n2 = (01),
n3 = (00), n4 = (11). The total sum results in n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = 4 ≤ 2h = 6.
Using this method, it is possible to merge an arbitrary number of bits to-
gether. Let S = dN/se. The instance of ILP that emerges after merging bits in
groups of s is the following:
Tx1 + qx2 −Rx3 + 0n1 + · · ·+ 0nS = y (16)
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under the conditions 
x1 = 1,
lx2 ≤ x2 ≤ ux2 ,
2h − 1 < y < 2N − 2N−h,
0 ≤ ni ≤ 2s − 1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ S,
h ≤
∑S







Hence the size of the ILP can be established a priori. The more bits one merges,
the harder it is that the ILP will return the correct solution, for it is expected
that the system of inequalities has more than one solution.
The following proposition shows that a solution (X,ϕ(X)) satisfying the
graph condition is also a solution to the system of inequalities (17) and, therefore,
it can be obtained via the ILP-oracle with the instance (16).
Proposition 2 Let F,G ∈ Zq so that ϕ(F ) = G and so that the Hamming
weight of seqN (F ) is h. Then there exists an instance (y, x2, x3, n1, . . . , nS) with
x3 = F and y = G that solves the system:
T + x2q −Rx3 = y,





0 ≤ ni ≤ 2s − 1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ S,
h ≤
∑S
i=1 ni ≤ 2s−1h.
(18)
Proof. The first equation and the first inequality are satisfied by the definition
of ϕ. The second equation and the second inequality represent the fact that we
are writing x3 in base 2
s. Hence the only remaining thing to prove is that the
last inequality holds.
Let F = F (0)20 + . . . + F (N − 1)2N−1. We notice that ni =
∑s−1
j=0 F ((i −
1)s+ j)2j . For the fact that
∑N−1













F ((i− 1)s+ j) = h.
We prove the second inequality by induction on h. For h = 1, ni is a string
of weight 1 of s bits. That is at most 2s−1.
Assuming that the inequality holds for h − 1. If ni ≤ 2s−1 for every i, the
inequality is satisfied. Hence we assume that there exists one j for which nj >
2s−1. This means that the Hamming weight of seqs(nj) ≥ 2. Then one gets:∑
i
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The sum of the Hamming weights of seqs(nj), j 6= i is at most h−2. By inductive
hypothesis, it follows that∑
i
ni ≤ 2s + 2s−1(h− 2) = 2s−1h.
The Proposition is proved. 
The following Proposition determines the size of U that one obtains from
considering the ILP (17).
Proposition 3 Let U be the set containing all 0 ≤ F < q, whose 2s-ary repre-
sentation satisfies 0 ≤ ni ≤ 2s − 1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ S and h ≤
∑S






where lt(n, d) is the number of integer solutions to z1 + . . .+ zn = d, 0 ≤ xi < t.
Proof. Let d be one of the values of
∑S
i=1 ni. For each d, we consider all the
possible configurations of n1, . . . , nS . Since each of these is bounded by 2
s − 1,
the number of legitimate configurations is l2s(S, d). 
Examples
In table 1 and table 2 we present the size of the resulting ILP instances depending
on the value of s and the corresponding success probability in two concrete
cases. We selected different choices of s and set V = {2N−t−1 +2h−1, . . . , 2N−t−
2N−t−h} for t satisfying log2(|U|) + t ≥ N . The probability of G ∈ V is reported
and corresponds to the success probability. Indeed, if G ∈ V then (F,G) is a
solution to the system of inequalities given by the intersection of (16) with (17)
and we expect it is its unique solution.
Following the attack here presented, we computed the probability that, given
a fixed s, EG is so that log2(|U|) + EG ≥ N . The random variable EG is dis-
tributed according to the negative hypergeometric distribution [4], where we are
looking for the probability that the first success (first ‘1’ valued bit) happens at
the EG-th trial, given a random sample without replacement from a population
of size N containing h successes.
The parameters chosen are N = 1279 and h = 17.
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Table 1.











We notice that for these parameters, N < 10h2, so it violates the guidelines
given in [2]. The reason for which these where chosen is to compare the success
probability with the attack by Beunardeau et al. [6], which was performed against
the previous version of the protocol.
The same experiments were reproduced with N = 1279 and h = 11.
Table 2.











Remark 4 While solving MLHRatioSP MLHCombSP for parameters N = 1279
and h = 17 is enough to break the cryptosystem described in [1], we remark that
the new security parameters suggested in [2] are h = 256 and N > 10h2.
Remark 5 It is possible to generalize all the presented approaches used to ac-
count for the weight of F to account also the weight of G. However this would
result in an increasing of the dimension of the ILP problem. One would nonethe-
less significantly increase the probability of success.
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Remark 6 The above work can be easily adjusted in order to solve the MLHRa-
tioSP by taking T = 0 and eliminating the variable x1.
4 A new family of weak keys
In [6] a family of weak keys was introduced for the MLHRatioSP. Those were the
ones for which all the ‘1’ valued bits appeared in the right hand side of seqN (F )
and seqN (G). As noted in [2], one can break keys is this family by performing
a rational reconstruction [19] of the quotient H. Aggarwal et al. also claim that
the family of weak keys described in [6] extends to the MLHCombSP as well. A
key in this family appears with probability 2−2h.
Using the rotations described in 3.1 and the ILP instance (5), we show that
this family can be extended. One can notice that many keys which have a long
sequence of zeros in the middle of their bit-sequence representation are not con-
sidered as weak keys in [6]. However, we show that this is a weakness that can
be exploited.
As mentioned above, one can perform up to N2 shifts in order to get F and G
as small as possible, so that it is more likely that EF +EG ≥ N . Let EF and EG
be respectively the length of the largest sequences of consecutive zeros of F and
G. The distribution of such values of EA is more difficult to compute and require
recursion. Again, the problem is modelled as an urn problem with h white balls
and N −h black balls, where all the balls are samples without replacement. The
probability P(EA ≥ k) can be thought as the complementary of the probability
that there are no sequences of consecutive black balls of length k. The latter, we
call p̄(b, w, k) and is recursively defined as follows:
p̄(b, w, k) =

1 if b ≤ k,
0 if b > k and w = 0,
w










w+b−k p̄(b− i, w − 1, k) otherwise.
Remark 7 The probability given here is actually slightly smaller than the actual
probability that the best shift has EA ≥ k, for the current formula does not
consider that the sequences of consecutive zeros can run from one extreme to the
other of seqN (A). As an example, seq10(A) = (0010001000) will give EA = 5,
while the p̄ distribution will consider for A that the longest sequence of zeros is
3.
Computing this expression is challenging even for small numbers. The esti-
mates that we used is the following. Let Ω be the family of multisets
Ω =
{
{0a0 , . . . , hah}|a0 ≥ ai ≥ 0 for i > 0,
h∑
i=1
ai = N − h
}
.
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This family represents all the possible sequences of zeroes and ones of length N
and weight h after the best shift. Let ψ : Z → Ω be the function that assigns an
element of weight h in Zq to the corresponding multiset in Ω. Due to symmetries,
there exist A,B ∈ Ω so that |ψ−1(A)| 6= |ψ−1(B)|, so the probability that for
a random multiset S ∈ Ω, a0 = k is different from p̄(h,N − h, k). Nevertheless,
experiments show that the two distributions are very similar. Hence we used the
former distribution, which is easier to compute, for the numerical examples.
These computations reveal a new family of weak keys: namely, if F and
G are so that EF + EG ≥ N . One can perform N2 rotations and guess up to
N − dN/he − h possible EF to find a unique solution to the intersection of (6)
and (7), where U = {2N−EF−1 + 2h−1, . . . , 2N−EF − 2EF−h+1 + 1} and where
V = {2EG−1 + 2h−1, . . . , 2EG − 2EG−h+1 + 1}. Such solution is obtained by asking
the ILP-oracle to solve instances of dimension 3.
For N = 1279 and h = 17, the expected EA is ≈ 256. For these parameters
and using the described estimates, one gets that P(EF + EG ≥ N) ≈ 2−11. This
improves upon Beunardeau et al. work for which approximately 1 over 234 keys
is weak.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We provide a generalization of the Beunardeu et al. attack to the case of MLH-
CombSP that runs with the same time complexity, as conjectured by Aggarwal
et al in [2].
We also extend the family of weak keys that should be avoided when gener-
ating the private key (F,G). Those keys can be successfully attacked with < N3
queries to an ILP-oracle that solves ILP instances of dimension 3.
Results in table 1 show that, using an ILP-oracle, the success probability can
be significantly higher compared to the one of the Beunardeu et al. attack [6, 7].
In practice, we would need to replace the ILP-oracle with an ILP solver. Since
many practical ILP algorithms do not provide the exact solution, we expect the
success probability to decrease, in the sense that, even though the system of
inequalities has exactly one solution, it is not detected by the ILP solver.
In general, it is not easy to determine the complexity of an ILP instance.
Unlike Linear Programming, the dimension of ILP is not determinant in estab-
lishing whether an instance is feasible or not to solve [5]. Therefore the size of the
ILPs emerging from our reduction is not necessarily related to their hardness.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of the ILP solvers available does not support
big numbers arithmetic. This prevented us from performing noteworthy experi-
ments since it is an essential requirement when considering parameters that are
cryptographically relevant. With a dedicated implementation it would be possi-
ble to perform such experiments that would provide empirical hints about the
real complexity of those ILP instances.
Anyhow, if one wanted to use the Aggarwal et al. cryptosystem, it is advisable
to investigate the nature of those ILP instances, to be sure that they do not
fall into any category that allows a fast solving algorithm. We remark that ILP
MLHCombSP can be reduced to an ILP Problem 15
problems in section 3 have only one expected possible solution and large portions
of the variables are bounded by relatively tight constraints.
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